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CHAPTER 13 
Contracts and Commercial Law 
DONNA M. SHERRY 
§13.1. Endorsement: Liability of Authorized Representatives. 
In affirming a summary judgment against the endorser of a check, the 
Supreme Judicial Court rendered an interesting interpretation under 
the Uniform Commercial Code ("Code")• of the liability of an author-
ized representative who endorses a check but fails to indicate his repre-
sentative capacity. In Commonwealth Bank & Trust Co. v. Plotkin, 2 a 
bank brought suit to recover from a corporate officer on a check which 
had been deposited in the corporation's account and later dishonored for 
insufficient funds. In affirming a superior court judgment, the Supreme 
Judicial Court held that the defendant was prima facie personally liable 
to the bank as endorser under the Code and that the defendant had 
failed to make a sufficient factual showing to prevent summary judg-
ment against him.3 
The defendant Plotkin was president and treasurer of Creative 
Travel, Inc. ("Creative"), a corporation which had provided services to 
a partnership. In payment for these services, one of the partners issued 
a personal check dated March 24, 1973, for $6,038 payable to the order 
of Creative. The check was deposited in Creative's account at Common-
wealth Bank and Trust Company. When this check was returned for 
insufficient funds, another partner issued a check dated April 13, 1973, 
in the same amount payable to Plotkin. Plotkin endorsed this second 
check by signing his name only directly beneath the stamp, "Creative 
Travel, Inc. for deposit only in account number 5-250," and deposited 
it in the corporation's account at the Commonwealth Bank. When the 
second check was returned for insufficient funds, it was redeposited at 
Plotkin's request but was again dishonored. The check was then charged 
* Donna M. Sherry is counsel for Honeywell Information Systems Inc., Waltham. 
§13.1. ' G.L. c. 106, § 1-101 et seq. 
2 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2442, 355 N.E.2d 917. 
3 /d. at 2442, 355 N.E.2d at 918. 
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back to the corporation's account, resulting in an overdraft.4 The bank 
brought suit against Plotkin to recover on his endorsement when it was 
unable to recover from the corporation. 
In response to the bank's motion for summary judgment, 5 Plotkin 
submitted an affidavit which stated that a named vice-president of the 
bank "well knew" that the second check was issued in place of the 
dishonored first check which was payable only to the corporation; that 
the second check was dishonored only after the bank had advised Crea-
tive that the check had cleared and the proceeds were available in the 
corporation's account; that consequently the corporation issued checks 
against that account; that the bank on many prior occasions had cred-
ited the corporation's account with checks payable to Plotkin but which 
were deposited by Plotkin as agent for the corporation; and that the 
bank "well knew" that Creative and not Plotkin was entitled to the 
proceeds of the check. 8 
The Supreme Judicial Court framed the question on appeal as 
whether under Section 3-403(2)(b) of the Code Plotkin's signature on the 
back of the dishonored check was an individual endorsement for which 
he was personally liable or one made in a representative capacity for 
which he would not be liable.7 
This section provides that "An authorized representative who signs 
his own name to an instrument ... (b) except as otherwise established 
between the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the instrument 
names the person represented but does not show that the representative 
signed in a representative capacity. . . . "8 
Plotkin argued that this section entitled him to a determination of 
whether it was "otherwise established between the immediate parties"' 
that he signed in a representative capacity, that is, that a jury must 
consider whether parol evidence indicated that there was an under-
• Id. at 2443, 355 N .E.2d at 918. 
1 Suit was originally brought in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston, was removed 
to the Superior Court, then was transferred to the Municipal Court of the City of Boston 
under G.L. c. 231, § 102C, for trial. Creative Travel, Inc. was added as a defendant and 
defaulted, and the Municipal Court found against Plotkin after a hearing. The case was 
then retransferred to the Superior Court. Id. at 2442-43, 355 N.E.2d at 918. 
• Id. at 2143-44, 355 N.E.2d at 918. 
7 Id. at 2143, 355 N.E.2d at 918. 
• G.L. c. 106, § 3-403(2)(b). Subsection (2)(b) provides: 
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument-
(b) except as otherwis.e established between the immediate parties, is per-
sonally obligated if the instrument names the person represented, but does 
not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity, or if the 
instrument does not name the person represented, but does show that the 
representative signed in a representative capacity. 
• See id. 
2
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standing or agreement between the bank and himself as to his represent-
ative capacity .10 Plotkin argued that the statements in his affidavit that 
the bank "knew" that the designation of Plotkin as payee of the check 
was an error and that his endorsement was merely in a representative 
capacity created a triable issue for a jury.U 
The Court accepted Plotkin's argument that section 3-403(2)(b) per-
mitted him to prove that as to the bank he was not personally liable, 
noting however, that the burden was on him to do so, 12 but found that 
Plotkin's affidavit failed to satisfy the requirements of Mass. R. Civ. P. 
56(e) and therefore did not prevent summary judgment against him as 
endorser. 13 The Court pointed out that the affidavit did not disclose who 
acted for the bank in the deposit of the check, the nature of the disclo-
sure of Plotkin's intention that he not be liable and any manifestation 
of such an intention made on behalf of the bank, or the authority for 
such manifestation. The statements in the affidavit concerning the 
bank's knowledge, the Court concluded, "fall well short of showing an 
agreement by the bank to accept for deposit without recourse a check 
with the payee's endorsement missing."14 
Although the Court accepted Plotkin's contention that section 3-
403(2)(b) allowed him to prove that he was not personaly liable to the 
bank, the Court nevertheless observed that this contention presents at 
least two difficulties. First, the Court pointed out that section 3-40315 
seems to be directed to the obligations of the original parties to an 
instrument rather than to endorsers and endorsees. The Court noted, 
" ld., § 3-403(2)(b), Official Comment 3. 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2444-45, 355 N.E.2d at 918-19. 
12 ld. at 2444, 355 N.E.2d at 918, citing Carleton Ford, Inc. v. Oste, 1973 Mass. App. 
Adv. Sh. 296, 295 N.E.2d 402 and Universal Lightning Rod, Inc. v. Risehall Electric Co., 
24 Conn. Supp. 399, 192 A.2d 50 (Cir. Ct. 1962). 
•• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2446, 355 N.E.2d at 919 . 
.. ld. 
•• G.L. c. 106, § 3-403 provides: 
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or other representative, and his author-
ity to make it may be established as in other cases of representation. No particular 
form of appointment is necessary to establish such authority. 
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an instrument 
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person rep-
resented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative capac-
ity; 
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate parties, is per-
sonally obligated if the instrument names the person represented but does 
not show that the representative signed in a representative capacity, or if the 
instrument does not name the person represented but does show that the 
representative signed in a representative capacity. 
(3) Except as otherwise established the name of an organization preceded or fol-
lowed by the name and office of an authorized individual is a signature made in a 
representative capacity. 
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however, that courts in other jurisdictions have admitted extrinsic evi-
dence to prove that irregular or anomalous endorsements out of the 
chain of title, which were placed on the instrument before its issue, were 
made in a representative capacity.18 Therefore, the application of the 
subsection to regular endorsements by payees may be permissible, the 
Court reasoned.17 
Second, the Court explained, if only the corporation had endorsed the 
check, the bank could have returned it without dishonor for lack of the 
payee's endorsement.18 Moreover, the bank, having given value by per-
mitting withdrawals, would have "the specifically enforceable right to 
have the unqualified endorsement" of Plotkin as "transferor, " 19 thereby 
making Plotkin personally obligated as endorser. 20 On the other hand, 
if Plotkin had transferred the check without endorsement to the corpo-
ration rather than to the bank, and then the corporation transferred to 
the bank by endorsement, Plotkin would not be one of the "immediate 
parties" to the endorsement transaction within section 3-403(2)(b).21 
The Court's reluctance to apply section 3-403(2)(b) to endorsements 
is well-founded. Although the difficulty foreseen by the Court if Plotkin 
had transferred the check without endorsement to the corporation does 
not arise under the facts of the case, a further weakness is demonstrated 
by the facts. In this case, the bank was simply a holder of the instru-
ment22 and was not one of the "immediate parties" to the underlying 
instrument or transaction. The decisions from other jurisdictions cited 
by the Supreme Judicial Court as applying section 3-403(2)(b) to en-
dorsements are inapposite since those decisions, 23 unlike the instant 
case, involved disputes between the endorser and the payee of an instru-
ment. While these cases stand for the proposition that parol evidence 
as to the representative capacity of Plotkin would be admissible in a 
dispute between the payee (Plotkin) and an endorser, they do not sup-
port the proposition that such evidence is admissible in a dispute be-
11 Id. at 2445, 355 N.E.2d at 919, citing Weather-Rite, Inc. v. Southdale Pro-Bowl, Inc., 
301 Minn. 346, 347, 222 N.W.2d 789, 791 (1974), Central Trust Co. v. J. Gottermeier Dev. 
Co., 65 Misc. 2d 676, 677, 319 N.Y.S.2d 25, 26 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1971), and Trenton Trust 
Co. v. Klausman, 222 Pa. Super. 400, 405, 296 A.2d 275, 277 (1974). 
17 The Court analogized a regular endorsement to a new instrument written on the back 
of the original instrument. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2445, 355 N.E.2d at 919. 
•• See G.L. c. 106, §§ 3-507(3), 3-411(3). 
11 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2445-46, 355 N.E.2d at 919, citing G.L. c. 106, § 3-201(3). 
• See G.L. c. 106, § 3-414. 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2446, 355 N.E.2d at 919. 
= The Code defines a "holder" as "a person who is in possession of a document of title 
or an instrument or an investment security drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order 
to bearer or in blank." G.L. c. 106, § 1-201(20). 
23 See note 16 supra and cases cited therein. 
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tween the bank as a holder of the check and Plotkin as an endorser. 24 
Plotkin therefore should not have been permitted to raise the defense 
that extrinsic facts demonstrated that Creative was the intended payee 
and that he therefore signed in a representative capacity.26 Accordingly, 
under section 3-307(2) of the Code, where signatures are admitted as 
genuine, as in the instant case, the bank, as holder, was entitled to 
recover on production of the check since Plotkin was unable to establish 
a defense.• 
§13.2. Negotiability of Postdated Check: Accelerabllity. In 
Smith v. Gentilotti, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court was presented with 
the question of whether a payee could recover on a postdated check 
which contained the drawer's endorsement stating that the face amount 
of the check should be paid from his estate if he died before the date of 
the check. Relying primarily on the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
Court held that the check was a negotiable instrument payable on de-
mand from the drawer's estate.2 
. I . 
The drawer executed a check on November 25, 1969, payable to the 
order of his son in the sum of $20,000, postdated it to November 4, 1984, 
and delivered it to the mother for safekeeping. The drawer also endorsed 
the check on the reverse side as follows: "For Edward Joseph Smith 
Gentilotti, My Son If I should pass away the amount of $20,000.00 
dollars Shall be taken from My Estate at death."3 Mter the father died 
in 1973, a demand for payment was made to the father's executrix. Upon 
her refusal to pay, the mother and son sued the executrix in probate 
court to recover the amount of the check. The Supreme Judicial Court, 
on its own motion, ordered direct review after the probate judge reported 
the case to the Appeals Court. 4 
The executrix defended on the grounds that the check was both not 
negotiable and unenforceable for want of consideration. The Court re-
jected both contentions. It first pointed out that on its face the check 
possessed the requisite elements to qualify as "negotiable" under Sec-
tion 3-104 of the Uniform Commercial Code:1 it was an instrument in 
14 G.L. c. 106, § 3-403, Official Comment 3. 
• See American Exchange Bank, Collinsville, Okla. v. CeBBna, 386 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. 
Okla. 1974) (bank which had honored check on which payment was stopped could recover 
from maker whose corporate title did not appear on the check to recover funds advanced 
to payee). 
• G.L. c. 106, § 3-307(2) (1957). The Supreme Judicial Court also dismissed a defense 
in the nature of estoppel for lack of an adequate factual predicate in Plotkin's affidavit. 
1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2447, 355 N.E.2d at 919. 
§13.2. ' 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. 220, 359 N.E.2d 953. 
1 ld. at 221-22, 359 N.E.2d at 955. 
1 Id. at 220, 359 N.E.2d at 953. 
4 ld. 
• ld. at 221, 355 N.E.2d at 955, citing G.L. c. 106, § 3-104. 5
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writing signed by the drawer ordering the bank to pay a sum certain on 
demand. • The postdating of the check did not affect its negotiability 
under the Code;7 the "1984" date merely determined the time at which 
the check was to be payable.8 
The Court then reasoned that the endorsement modified the check in 
two ways. • First, it provided for an acceleration of the time of payment, 
a permissible practice under the Code. 10 Second, the endorsement re-
quired direct payment from the father's estate, rather than presentment 
to the drawee bank. Payment from the father's estate upon his death 
would have been prescribed by law in any event, 11 the Court noted, 
because the bank was not authorized to pay the check more than ten 
days after the drawer's death if it had knowledge of his death. 12 The 
Court, therefore, excused presentment to the bank as a "futile gesture" 
and held that the mother and son, as holders, had an immediate right 
to demand payment from the father's estate. 13 
With respect to the executrix's second contention, the Court acknowl-
edged that the mother and son, unless they had the rights of a holder 
in due course, held the check subject to the defense of want of considera-
tion.•• The Court noted, however, that under the Code the mother and 
son established a prima facie case by producing the check and proving 
the signatures10 and the executrix had the burden of proving as an af-
firmative defense the lack of consideration. The Court, after reviewing 
the findings and evidence, accepted the probate court's ruling that the 
executrix failed to prove her defense of lack of consideration.•• 
• G.L. c. 106, § 3-104 provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within this Article must 
(a) be signed by the maker or drawer; and 
(b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in 
money and no other promise, order, obligation or power given by the maker 
of drawer except as authorized by this Article; and 
(c) be payable on demand or at a definite time; and 
(d) be payable to order or to bearer. 
7 /d., § 8-114(1). 
' Id., § 3-114(2). 
1 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 222, 359 N.E.2d at 955. 
" G.L. c. 106, § 3-109(1)(c). 
II /d., §§ 3-413(2), 3-507(1)(b). 
12 /d., § 4-405. Under the Code, provisions relative to the source of payment of an 
instrument do not make an otherwise unconditional promise conditional, which would 
destroy negotiability. ld., §§ 3-105(1)(f), 3-104. 
11 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 221-22, 349 N.E.2d at 955. 
1• Id. at 222, 359 N.E.2d at 955. 
II /d. See G.L. c. 106, §§ 3-306(c), 3-307(2). Cf. Loew v. Minasian, 361 Mass. 390, 391, 
280 N .E.2d 688 (1972) (summary judgment for plaintiff upheld for failure to present facts 
on affirmative defenses). 
11 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 222, 359 N.E.2d at 955. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court's view of the negotiability of the check 
in Smith is supported by Code principles and is consistent with the view 
taken by Code commentators. 17 The Code draws a distinction between 
instruments payable upon the happening of an event which will happen 
at an uncertain time and those payable at a definite time subject to an 
acceleration. 18 The former are always nonnegotiable even though it is 
certain that the event will happen at some time or, in fact, has hap-
pened.1' Thus, an instrument payable only upon the death of the maker 
is nonnegotiable because when made, the time of maker's death is un-
certain. 
Instruments, payable at a definite time but subject to acceleration, 
however, are not subject to the same uncertainty despite the presence 
of the acceleration provision.20 Even if the time of acceleration or accel-
eration itself is uncertain, there is still a certain time of payment, be-
yond which the instrument cannot run, stated on the face of the instru-
ment. 21 Therefore, commentators maintain that, as in the Smith case, 
a check payable on a certain date or upon the death of the maker, 
whichever occurs first, is negotiable.22 The death of the maker simply 
accelerates the time of payment to the date of his death rather than the 
date of the check. Thus, the acceleration clause does not affect a check's 
negotiability, because the time of payment "is no less certain than a 
note payable on demand, whose negotiability never has been ques-
tioned. "23 
§ 13.3. Revocation of Acceptance: Effective Notice. In Dixon v. 
Yale Manufacturing Company, 1 the Appellate Division of the District 
Courts held that a notice of revocation of acceptance need not be in 
writing in order to be procedurally effective under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code ("Code"). The Appellate Division's holding comports with 
principles embodied in the Code but it does conflict with approaches 
taken by some other jurisdictions in this area of Code interpretation. 
17 See note 20 infra. 
18 G.L. c. 106, § 3-109(1)(c) and (3). 
" G.L. c. 106, §§ 3-104, 3-109(2) & Mass. Code Comment. 
11 Id., § 3-109(1)(c) & Official Comment 4. 
21 Id. 
22 "It would appear, however, that an instrument payable June 1, 1995, or upon the 
death of the maker, whichever occurs first is a negotiable instrument because it is a note 
payable at a definite time subject to acceleration." F. HART & W. W!WER, CoMMERCIAL 
PAPER § 2.13(3) Bender UCC Sen;. Professor William D. Hawkland also presents an 
example of a valid acceleration clause: "I promise to pay 100 years from date, but payment 
shall be accelerated by the death of my Uncle George to a point in time 6 weeks after said 
death." Hawkland, Commercial Paper 14-19 (Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Edu-
cation of the American Law Institute and American Bar Association, November 1959). 
u G.L. c. 106, § 3-109, Official Comment 4. 
§13.3. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. (App. Div.) 57. 
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In Dixon, the plaintiff, who planned to open a beauty parlor in her 
new home, ordered beauty shop equipment consisting of two wet booths, 
two chairs, two sinks and two mirrors from the defendant manufacturer, 
and made a deposit therefor on July 26, 1971. When she went to pick 
up the equipment, she discovered that the two wet booths were the 
incorrect style and left them with the defendant. Nevertheless, she 
paid the balance of the purchase price including the amount due for the 
wet booths. Four days later she discovered that the chairs were defective 
and returned them to the defendant who agreed to fix the chairs and to 
deliver the correct wet booths within two weeks. When the equipment 
was not ready within that period, the plaintiff installed her old equip-
ment in her new home and had her attorney write the defendant on 
September 29, 1971, requesting the return of the money she had paid 
for the wet booths and the chairs. 
The defendant responded by letter on October 1, 1971, stating that 
the equipment had been manufactured according to her specifications 
and that he was awaiting shipping instructions. On December 21, 1971, 
the defendant, without prior notice, delivered the wet booths and chairs 
to the plaintiff's home, leaving them in the garage because no one was 
home. The plaintiff declined to utilize the equipment and on February 
29, 1972, she again had her attorney write the defendant requesting 
return of the money she had paid for the two wet booths and chairs. The 
attorney's letter specifically pointed out that the booths and chairs were 
neither merchantable nor conformed to contract specifications. 2 Obtain-
ing no satisfaction, the plaintiff brought a contract action in the Munici-
pal Court of the City of Boston. 
After losing in Municipal Court, the defendant appealed. In the Ap-
pellate Division, the defendant's principal argument was that the letters 
from the plaintiff's attorney did not constitute a procedurally effective 
revocation of acceptance.3 The Appellate Division disagreed and af-
firmed the trial court's judgment, stating that it was not necessary to 
rely solely upon the letters to find an effective revocation. 4 Thus, the 
Appellate Division looked at the entire record and found that it con-
tained sufficient additional evidence upon which the trial court could 
have based its finding that there was a procedurally effective revocation 
of acceptance. Specifically, the appellate court pointed to the plaintiff's 
oral notification when she returned the defective chairs that she would 
be "forced" to reinstall her old equipment if the defects and noncon-
formities were not remedied expeditiously. 5 This oral notification, the 
2 ld. at 575. 
3 ld. at 576. 
4 ld. at 578. 
• I d. at 577-78. 
8
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appellate court reasoned, and the fact that the equipment was left in 
the plaintiffs garage some four months later without notice to her con-
stituted additional evidence of an effective revocation of acceptance. 
Thus, because the letters were not dispositive of the issue of the revoca-
tion's effectiveness, the appellate court refused to consider arguments 
as to whether the letters, standing alone, constituted an effective revoca-
tion of acceptance.• 
The appellate court's ruling as to the effectiveness of the plaintiffs 
revocation comports with principles embodied in the Code. Under the 
Code, the buyer is liable for the price of "goods accepted," unless he 
makes a procedurally effective revocation of acceptance for which there 
are substantive grounds.7 Such a revocation then will bar the seller's 
right to recover the price of the goods previously accepted. 8 Section 2-
608 of the Code sets up the specific conditions u:nder which a buyer can 
make such a revocation. 1 It requires that the goods be nonconforming, 
that the nonconformity substantially impair the value of the goods to 
the buyer, that the nonconforming goods be accepted on the reasonable 
assumption that the nonconformities would be seasonably cured, and 
that the nonconformities were not so cured. 10 In addition, notice of revo-
cation must be given within a· reasonable time after the buyer discovers 
the nonconformity. 11 
The Code, however, does not set forth any requirements for the form 
or content of the notice of revocation. However, the Official Comment 
to Section 2-608 does offer some guidelines: the content of the notice "is 
to be determined . . . by considerations of good faith, prevention of 
surprise, and reasonable adjustment."12 
This comment, when viewed in conjunction with the language of Sec-
tion 2-608 itself, supports the Appellate Division's conclusion that a 
"revocation under . . . the Uniform Commercial Code does not have to 
be in writing to be effective."13 The comment envisions that a court will 
• ld. at 578. 
7 G.L. c. 106, § 2-709(1) . 
• ld. 
• G.L. c. 106, § 2-608. See generally J. WHITE & R. SuMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw 
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 253-66 (1972 ed.). 
•• ld., § 2-608(1)(a). 
11 ld., § 2-608(2). Revocation of acceptance therefore is available in a more limited 
number of instances than rejection of goods prior to their acceptance; rejection is available 
for any nonconformity in goods or their tender of delivery whether or not value is impaired. 
ld., § 2-601. 
12 ld., § 2-608 Official Comment 5. The comment also states that "the reqirements of 
the content of notification are less stringent in the case of a nonmerchant buyer." I d. The 
Appellate Division in Dixon did not indicate whether it considered the plaintiff a mer-
chant or nonmerchant buyer. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. (App. Div.) at 578, citing Performance Motor Inc. v. Allar, 280 
N.C. 385, 395 (1972). 
9
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do as the Dixon court did; it will analyze the totality of the facts and 
circumstances to determine the propriety of a purported revocation. 14 
In Dixon, there was evidence that the seller knew that the wet booths 
were the incorrect style, that the chairs were defective, and that these 
nonconformities would have to be cured within a short time if the goods 
were to be of value to the plaintiff. 16 Written notice of these facts was 
not necessary to give the seller an opportunity to make a substitute 
performance. 11 Hence, the Appellate Division's holding that the plain-
tiff's oral statements, the attorney's letters and the defendant's own 
actions supported the trial court's finding of a procedurally effective 
revocation under Section 2-608 cannot be said to be erroneous. 
Courts in other jurisdictions which have considered the requisites of 
an effective notice of revocation under Section 2-608, however, have 
reached divergent results with respect to the requirement that the notice 
be in writing. Most courts have found that any kind of notice is effective 
if in any reasonable manner it informs the seller that the buyer has 
revoked acceptance, identifies the particular goods which are noncon-
forming, and discloses the nature of the nonconformity .17 Indeed, one 
court has said that effective notice may be implied solely from the 
conduct of the parties where a nonmerchant buyer is involved. 18 Yet 
some jurisdictions have not been so liberal, requiring notice of revoca-
tion to be in writing and to be carefully drafted at that. 19 
The construction of Section 2-608 adopted the the Appellate Divison 
and by most jurisdictions is preferable where the seller has adequate and 
timely notice and the buyer has substantive grounds to revoke accept-
14 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. (App. Div.) at 574-75, 577. 
11 From the facts reported, it does not appear that the buyer ever accepted the wet 
booths, but rejected them upon tender as authorized under section 2-601 ofthe Code. G.L. 
c. 106, § 2-601. 
11 See, e.g., Boysen v. Antioch Sheet Metal, Inc., 14 U.S.C. Rep. 120 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) 
("Notice of revocation need not be in any particular form or use particular words if the 
buyer has adequately informed the seller that he does not want the goods and does not 
wish to retain them"); Lynx v. Ordnance Products, Inc., (Md. Ct. App. 1974). ("The 
criterion of good faith and the consideration that a speedy inexpensive method of opera-
tion is desirable lead to the conclusion that the form and content of such notice of revoca-
tion should inform the seller that the buyer has revoked, identify the particular goods as 
to which he has revoked and set forth the nature of the non-conformity since such notice 
would corroborate the buyer's good faith and give the seller an opportunity to make a 
substitute performance to maintain good will or avoid litigation"). 
" See Fentar v. Contemporary Dev. Co., Inc. 529 P.2d 883 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). See 
note 12 supra. 
11 See, e.g., GrOBSman v. D'Or, 98 Ill. App. 2d 198, 240 N.E.2d 266 (1968) (buyer's letters 
asking credit on return of unused merchandise did not meet notice requirement of section 
2-608); see also Cohen Salvage Corp. v. Eastern Elec. Sales Co., Inc., 205 Pa. Super. Ct. 
26, 206 A.2d 331 (1965) (notice of rejection must be in writing). 
II G.L. c. 106, § 1-106. 
10
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ance. To require the notice to be in writing in such cases simply does 
not comport with the principle that the Code's remedies should "be 
liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put 
in as good a position as if the other party has fully performed .... "20 
§ 13.4. . Construction Bonds - Timely Filing of Claim - Actual 
Use of Materials. In two cases decided during the Survey year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court was presented with the opportunity to construe 
the statutes' relating to public and private construction surety bonds. 
The Court's primary concern in each case was ensuring that a supplier's 
legitimate claim for payment under a surety bond for materials fur-
nished to a contractor would not be thwarted by a technical interpreta-
tion of the applicable bond statute. 
In the first case, International Heating & Air Conditioning Corp. v. 
Rich Construction Co., Inc., 2 a subcontractor oil a municipal construc-
tion project issued a purchase order to the supplier for certain equip-
ment which the supplier shipped in four installments. Approximately 
one year after the date of the last shipment, the supplier, when testing 
the installed equipment for proper functioning, discovered that four 
rubber pads used as vibration eliminators for a large piece of the equip-
ment had not been installed. Shortly thereafter, the supplier sent the 
rubber pads to the job site without charge, but apparently they were 
never installed nor used in the project. Within ninety days after the 
rubber pads were sent, the supplier filed a sworn notice of claim for 
payment under a surety bond of the project's general contractor.3 
Since this was a public construction project, the general contractor 
was required to obtain the bond by Section 29 of Chapter 149 of the 
General Laws to secure "payment ... for materials used or em-
ployed. "4 The statute also permits a supplier furnishing materials to a 
subcontractor on the project to recover under the bond by filing a claim 
within ninety days after the day on which the claimant last furnished 
materials. 5 
The surety's sole contention before the Supreme Judicial Court was 
that the supplier's claim was not timely filed. Based on a strict interpre-
tation of the bond statute, the surety argued that the statutory "claim" 
or "debt" arises on the date that the last materials furnished are incor-
porated into a project. Therefore because the rubber pads were not so 
21 G.L. c. 106, § 1-106. 
§13.4. I G.L. c. 149, § 29, 29A. 
z 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 458, 360, N.E.2d 636. 
s Id. at 458, 460, 360 N.E.2d at 636, 637. Subsequently, the supplier intervened as 
plaintiff in a suit brought by another claimant against the general contractor and the 
surety company. Similarly, the subcontractor to whom the materials had been supplied 
intervened as defendant. I d. at 459, 360 N .E.2d at 636. 
• G.L. c. 149, § 29. 
I Id. 
11
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incorporated, the statutory filing period had expired almost a year ear-
lier.• Support for this argument was found in the earlier Supreme Judi-
cial Court decision of Lock Joint Pipe Co. v. Commonwealth, 7 where the 
Court, in construing a similar bond statute, stated in dictum: "The 
import of our cases is that the sworn statement of claim must be filed 
within [ninety] days after the claimant furnishes the last materials 
which become part of the installation. "8 
Before addressing the surety's contention, the Court first reviewed the 
legislative and judicial history of the Massachusetts public construction 
bond statute. It pointed out that its underlying purpose was to provide 
laborers and materialmen security equivalent to the lien created on 
private property under the mechanics' lien statute.• The Court then 
noted that it formerly viewed the early mechanics' lien law as a purely 
statutory right whic.h required strict compliance with its requirements. 10 
Accordingly, it previously had construed that statute as creating no lien 
for material furnished unless the materials were physically incorporated 
into the construction work. 11 This reasoning, the Court explained, had 
been extended by analogy to preclude claims under the public construc-
tion bond statute until a materialman's performance was complete.l2 
The Court declined, however, to continue construing the public con-
struction bond statute according to the same principles as utilized in 
construing the mechanics' lien statute.13 Rather, the Court stated that 
under the modem view the bond statute is to be given a "broad or liberal 
construction to accomplish its intended purpose."14 Consistent with this 
view, claims in Lock Joint Pipe and other cases•• were upheld because 
they were filed within the statutory period after the date of last delivery 
of materials for a project even though "some of the materials . . . were 
never installed."11 Thus, the Court held that the supplier's claim in the 
instant case was timely filed since it was filed within ninety days of the 
date on which the last materials for the project - the rubber pads -
• 1977 M8S8. Adv. Sh. at 462, 360 N.E.2d at 638. 
7 331 Mass. 346, 118 N.E.2d 869 (1954). 
1 Id. at 351-52, 118 N.E.2d at 873. 
• The mechanics' lien law is presently codified at G.L. c. 254, §§ 2, 3. 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 462, 360 N.E.2d at 638. See Gale v. Blaikie, 129 Mass. 206, 
209 (1880). 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 461, 360 N.E.2d. at 637. See Walsh Holyoke Steam Boiler 
Works, Inc. v. McCue, 289 Mass. 291, 294, 194 N.E. 117, 118 (1935). See also George A. 
Sampson Co. v. Commonwealth, 202 M8S8. 326, 88 N.E. 911 (1909). 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 461, 360 N.E.2d at 637, citing International Business Macha. 
Corp. v. Quinn Bros. Elect. Co., 321 Mass. 16, 19, 71 N.E.2d 406, 408 (1947). 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 462-63, 36 N.E.2d at 638. 
14Jd. 
11 See, e.g., American Filler Co. v. Innamorati Bros., 358 M8S8. 146, 260 N.E.2d 718 
(1970). 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 463, 360 N.E.2d at 638. 
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were delivered even though the pads were not installed. 17 The Court 
reasoned that: 
[i]t would be anomalous if the subsequent failure of the subcon-
tractor to install [the rubber pads] were retroactively to render 
the supplier's claim untimely. The anomaly would not be founded 
in the words of the statute. In a case of first impression, we are not 
prepared so to extend the outworn analogy to superseded mechan-
ics' lien statutes.•• 
The Court's broad view of the public construction bond statute ex-
pressed in International Heating resurfaced in M. Lasden, Inc. v. Decker 
Electrical Corp., 11 where the Court construed Section 29A of Chapter 
149 of the General Laws, the private construction bond statute. In 
Lasden, a supplier had furnished materials to a subcontractor on a 
private construction project for which the general contractor had ob-
tained a surety bond, protecting all claimants of the contractor or his 
subcontractors. The surety bond secured payment only for materials 
"used or reasonably required for use in the performance of the Con-
tract."• Unknown to the supplier, however, some materials shipped to 
the job site were not used in that construction project but were used by 
the subcontractor in other projects not covered by the bond. Mter the 
subcontractor was adjudicated bankrupt, the supplier filed suit against 
the subcontractor, the contractor and the surety to recover monies owed 
for supplies delivered. The superior court allowed recovery against the 
surety based on the theory that the bond covered the materials shipped 
to the job site because the shipper had a reasonable expectation that 
they would be used in the construction of the project. 21 
The surety's sole contention on appeal was that the bond's coverage 
was strictly limited by its terms. Accordingly, the surety argued that 
there could be recovery against the bond only for "materials either ac-
tually used in construction or those materials meeting the contractual 
specifications purchased by [the subcontractor] with the reasonable 
possibility that they would be so used. "22 
The Supreme Judicial Court first noted that the language of the bond 
in question tracked that of the private construction bond statute.23 The 
17 I d. at 464, 360 N .E.2d at 638. 
11 Id., 360 N.E.2d at 638-39. 
11 1977 Man. Adv. Sh. 508, 360 N.E.2d 1068. 
• ld. at 509, 360 N.E.2d at 1068. 
11 I d. at 510, 360 N .E.2d at 1069. 
11 ld. at 511, 360 N.E.2d at 1069. 
11 G.L. c. 149, f 29A, which provides, in relevant part: 
Whenever any surety bond shall be given in connection with any written contract 
for the erection . . . of any private building . . . containing a condition for the 
payment of all labor and material used or reasonably required for uae in the per-
13
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Court therefore reasoned that since the bond's enforceability apparently 
was contingent on that statute, it should be construed in light of the 
statute's policies.u Those policies, the Court explained, are similar to 
the policies underlying the public contruction bond statute: the broad 
remedial purpose of affording security to subcontractors and material-
men.25 Having determined that the policies of the two bond statutes are 
similar, the Court pointed out, however, that there is a critical differ-
ence in the language of the two statutes. Specifically, the private con-
struction bond statute, unlike the public bond statute, does not require 
that materials supplied be "used or employed" in a project in order for 
a supplier to have a right of payment; rather, the materials furnished 
must be only "used or reasonably required for use."21 Therefore, the 
Court reasoned, it need not follow its earlier decision in Walsh Holyoke 
Steam Boiler Works, Inc. v. McCue, 27 where it had interpreted the pub-
lic construction bond statute as requiring the actual use of material in 
a construction project as a prerequisite to recovery.28 Instead, the Court 
held that the supplier in the instant case could recover against the bond 
for materials furnished to the subcontractor because he had a reasonable 
and good faith belief that the materials would be used in the construc-
tion project covered by the bond, even though they were not actually 
used.21 
This conclusion, the Court noted, was in accord with interpretations 
of the federal public construction bond statute, 30 as well as mechanics' 
lien statutes of many other states. 31 Such statutes have been construed 
uniformly to cover materials that were supplied with the good faith 
belief that they were to be incorporated into a particular project even 
though not actually so incorporated.32 Moreover, the Court indicated 
that its decision in Lasden not only was consistent with the policies 
enunciated in International Heating but also was supported by common 
business practices. A supplier falling within the protected class of the 
bond should not have his protections nullified by the unknown actions 
formance of the contract, any person who furnishes such labor or materials shall 
be entitled to sue for his own use and benefit upon such bond in accordance with 
its provisions and need not prove that he relied upon the bond furnishing labor or 
material. 
:w 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 512, 360 N.E.2d at 1070 . 
.,. Id . 
.,. See G.L. c. 149, § 29A. 
17 289 Mass. 291, 194 N.E. 117 (1935). 
21 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 512-13, 360 N.E.2d at 1070. 
11 Id. at 510, 515, 360 N.E.2d at 1069, 1071. 
:so 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) (1970). 
11 See generally Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 843, 846-49 & n.13 (1961). 
n See, e.g., Idaho Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Digiacomo, 61 Idaho 383, 102 P.2d 637 
(1940). But cf. Burnett v. Beadle, 142 Colo. 239, 75 P.2d 843 (1904). 
14
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of a subcontractor, nor should he be burdened with having to insure that 
materials supplied were actually incorporated into a project. 33 
The Supreme Judicial Court's opinions in International Heating and 
Lasden indicate that the Court is prepared to construe liberally both the 
public and private bond statutes and perhaps the analogous mechanic's 
lien statute as well. 14 The Court apparently has abandoned its former 
rule of strict construction of such statutes in favor of construction to 
effectuate the underlying purpose of the statutes of providing security 
for suppliers of material for construction projects. 
This liberal approach, the Court noted, conflicts with its previous 
narrow position in McCue and other cases where it construed the public 
construction bond statute as requiring actual use of materials in the 
construction of a project before a supplier's claim would be upheld.36 In 
International Heating, the Court did not consider whether recovery 
could be had under the public construction bond statute for materials 
delivered but not installed as the materials in that case (rubber pads) 
were provided without charge.31 The Court, however, in Lasden deliber-
ately refrained from overruling its decision in McCue, noting that the 
scope of materialman's protection under the public bond statute is ex-
tended by the "specific words" of that statute.37 The difference in lan-
guage between the private and public bond statutes thus seems anoma-
lous in view of the Court's finding that the purposes of both statutes are 
identical. 
Hence, Lasden and International Heating, when read together, sug-
gest that legislative action would be appropriate to conform the public 
construction bond statute to its private bond counterpart so as to afford 
the same protection to suppliers of public and private construction pro-
jects. Indeed, in view of the Court's increasingly liberal construction of 
the payment bond statutes in general, 31 these two cases may foreshadow 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 513-15, 360 N.E.2d at 1070-71. 
14 The Court explained in a footnote that the question of whether delivery alone will 
sustain a mechanics' lien under G.L. c. 254, §§ 2, 3 is still open. Id. at 513 n.5, 360 N.E.2d 
at 1070. Yet, it seems that the Court's reasoning in Lasden can be extended by analogy 
to the mechanics' lien statute. Accordingly, the Court may find that delivery is sufficient 
to sustain such a lien in a case where the iBBue is properly before the Court. 
11 Id. at 514, 360 N.E.2d at 1071. See, e.g., McCue, 289 Mass. at 294, 194 N.E. at 118; 
American Casting Co. v. Commonwealth, 274 MaBB. 1, 6, 174 N.E. 174, 176 (1931). See 
also Lock Joint Pipe, 331 M888. at 353, 118 N.E.2d at ~70, where the Court permitted 
recovery for the proportionate amount of materials installed as compared to the amount 
delivered. 
11 1977 M888 Adv. Sh. at 464, 360 N.E.2d at 638. The Court stated, however, the iBBue 
in the instant case concerned the timeliness of the filed claim, and therefore, it did not 
reach the question "as to the amount to be recovered if the claim was timely filed." Id. 
at 463, 360 N.E.2d at 638. 
17 1977 M888. Adv. Sh. at 513, 360 N.E.2d at 1070. 
11 See, e.g., American Air Filter Co. v. Innamorati Bros., 358 Mass. 146,260 N.E.2d 718 
• 
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the eventual overruling of McCue and its requirement that materials be 
actually used in a public construction project, even absent legislative 
action. 
§13.5. Fair Trade Repealed. During the Survey year, the General 
Court of the Commonwealth joined a growing number of jurisdictions 
in repealing the state's Fair Trade Law.• 
The Massachusetts Fair Trade Law, Sections 14A-14D of Chapter 93 
of the General Laws, originally enacted in 1937, provided that no con-
tract for the sale or resale of a commodity bearing a trademark, brand 
or name of the producer and in fair and open competition with commod-
ities of the same general class produced by others would be in violation 
of any state law because the buyer agreed not to resell the commodity 
at less than a minimum stipulated price.2 Further, the Fair Trade Law 
made it unlawful for a person to advertise, to offer for sale or to sell a 
fair-traded product below its fair trade price.3 
Born in the Depression, fair trade legislation, commonly referred to 
as "resale price maintenance", was designed to protect trademark own-
ers, distributors, and the public against injurious practices, such as loss-
leader and cut-rate merchandising, in the distribution of products of a 
standard quality under a distinguishing trademark, brand or trade 
name.4 California adopted the first state fair trade law in 193P; during 
the 1930's a number of states followed suit, and by 1941 Delaware be-
came the forth-fifth state to enact such legislation. • The constitution-
ality of state fair trade laws was upheld by the United States Supreme 
Court in 1936.7 Shortly thereafter, federal legislation was enacted in 
1937 and later in 1952, creating exemptions from the Sherman Antitrust 
(1970); Warren Bros. Roads Co. v. Joseph Rugo, Inc., 355 Mass. 382, 245 N.E.2d 243 
(1969). 
§13.5. 1 Acts of 1977, c. 74, § 1. The General Court also eliminated reference to viola-
tion of the Fair Trade Law as grounds for suspension of a license or permit for alcoholic 
beverages. Acts of 1977, c. 74, § 2. 
z G.L. c. 93, § 14A. 
3 G.L. c. 93, § 14B. In 1973 the Supreme Judicial Court held that the "nonsigner 
provision" of the statute, which compelled a person who had not entered into a "fair 
trade" contract to observe fair trade prices, amounted to an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative power to private parties. Coming Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc. of 
Danvers, 363 Mass. 409, 294 N.E.2d 354 (1973). See 1973 ANN. SURv. MASs. LAw§ 10.15. 
4 For a more complete discussion, see Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. Cm. L. 
REv. 175 (1954); Herman, Fair Trade, Origins, Purposes and Competitive Effects, 27 GEo. 
WASH. L. REv. 621 (1959); 12 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 982 (1971). 
• CAL. Bus. & PRor. CODE § 16,900-13 (West 1964), repealed by Laws of 1975, Chapter 
429 (effective January 1, 1976). 
• DEL. CODE ANN., Title 6, c. 19, §§ 1901-07, repealed by Del. Laws of 1976, H.B. No. 
356 (effective June 18, 1976). 
7 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936). 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1977 [2012], Art. 16
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1977/iss1/16
276 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §13.6 
Act• and the Federal Trade Commission Act• for state laws or policies 
legalizing "fair trade" practices.10 
In the 1950's, however, numerous state courts began to invalidate, in 
whole or part, their fair trade legislation on state constitutional 
grounds.11 In 1975, the Federal Consumer Goods Pricing Act12 repealed 
the portions of the Sherman Antitrust Act and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act which authorized states to insulate resale price maintenance 
from federal antitrust scrutiny. Of the forty-six states that had enacted 
fair trade laws, 11 fifteen states repealed them in 1975, with twelve more 
following suit in 1976 and 1977. 
With the demise of the Massachusetts Fair Trade Law, legislative 
protection against predatory price cutting by merchants henceforth will 
be governed by the Unfair Sales Act, Sections 14E-14K of Chapter 93 
of the General Laws. That Act effectively prohibits a retailer or whole-
saler from selling merchandise at less than cost plus a mark-up to cover 
the cost of doing business.14 
§ 13.6. Small Business Purchasing Program. The General Court 
established a statutory preference for purchases by the Commonwealth 
of goods and services from small businesses within the state. 1 Under 
this new statute the Secretary of Administration and Finance is charged 
with establishing and implementing a program that ensures that the 
aggregate amount of purchases by the state from small business equals 
or exceeds five (5) percent of the aggregate of all purchases made by the 
Commonwealth. z A "small business" is defined as a business which is 
independently owned and operated, has its principal place of business 
within Massachusetts, is not dominant in its field of operation, and is 
not a corporation which is a member of an affiliated group. 3 The Secre-
I 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970), 
1 15 U.S.C. I 45(a) (1970). 
11 15 U.S.C. 11 (1970) (Miller- Tydings Amendment to Sherman Antitrust Act); 15 
U.S.C. I 45(a) (1970) (McGuire Act). 
11 By the end of 1977, five state fair trade laws had been held unconstitutional. 2 TRADE 
RBo. REP. (CCH) 1 6041. 
11 Pub. L. No. 94-145, amending 15 U.S.C. 1§1, 45(a) (effective March 11, 1976). 89 
Stat. 801. 
11 Alaska, Missouri, Texas, and Vermont never had fair trade laws. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 
(CCH) 1 6041. 
14 The statutory mark-up is 6 percent of the total cost at the retail outlet and 2 percent 
of the total cost at the wholesale establishment. G.L. c. 93, I 14E(a), (b). 
§13.6. 1 Acta of 1976, c. 434. 
1 The Secretary has the authority to include specific purchases in the program if neces-
sary to achieve the five percent minimum. Acta of 1976, c. 434, I 3. 
1 An affiliated group is defmed as one or more chains of corporations connected through 
ownership with a common parent corporation. A stock ownership test is established for 
the defmition of an "affiliated group": (1) Stock representing 20 percent of voting power 
17
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tary has the further responsibility of ensuring that participants in the 
program include small businesses which are beneficially owned and con-
trolled by one or more minority individuals. 
§13.7. Automated Banking Facilities for Credit Unions. The au-
thority to utilize remote, automated, unmanned facilities to electroni-
cally disburse funds for customer convenience, previously accorded only 
to trust companies and savings or cooperative banks, is now extended 
to credit unions.1 
§ 13.8. Real Estate Loans. The General Court enacted a series of 
amendments relating to mortgage loans. First, it extended the maxi-
mum allowable term of the note for certain real estate loans secured by 
a first mortgage made, acquired, or participated in by cooperative banks 
to thirty-five years. 1 Second, cooperative banks were·authorized to make 
or acquire loans secured by a second mortgage on residential real estate 
for noncommercial or non-business purposes for an amount up to ten 
thousand dollars.2 Third, credit unions were authorzed to make ninety 
percent mortgage loans on single or two-family residences to an aggre-
gate amount of fifteen percent of the aggregate balance of the shares, 
deposits, guaranty fund, reserve fund, and undivided earnings of the 
credit union. 3 Fourth, credit unions which are insured in full under 
federal or state law and whose shares and deposits aggregate more than 
two million dollars were authorized to loan up to fifty thousand dollars 
upon any parcel of real estate. 4 Fifth, credit unions were also authorized 
to make or acquire loans secured by a second mortgage on residential 
real estate for noncommercial or nonbusiness purposes. The aggregate 
amount of such loans may be ten percent of the credit union's assets, 
provided that the' amount of any such loan, when added to the balance 
due on the first mortgage, does not exceed eighty percent of the value 
of the real estate as determined by the union's credit committee or ten 
thousand dollars, whichever is less.5 Any such loan must be repaid 
within ten years. Sixth, savings banks were allowed to amortize certain 
real estate loans secured by a first mortgage (eighty percent, ninety 
of all classes of stock and at least 20 percent of each non-voting class of each member of 
the affiliated group (except parent) is owned directly by one or more members of the 
group; and (2) parent owns directly stock representing 20 percent of voting power of all 
classes of stock and at least 20 percent of each non-voting class of at least one of the other 
members of the group. Acts of 1976, c. 434, § 2(6). 
§13.7. 1 Acts of 1977, c. 32, amending G.L. c. 167, § 65. 
§13.8. 1 Acts of 1977, c. 70, amending G.L. c. 170, § 24(3), (3A), (3B). 
2 Acts of 1977, c. 195, adding G.L. c. 170, § 24B. 
s Acts of 1977, c. 20, amending G.L. c. 171, § 24(B)(a)(4). 
' Acts of 1977, c. 22, amending G.L. c. 171, § 24(B)(b)(8). 
• Acts of 1977, c. 23, adding G.L. c. 171, § 24(B)(a)(7). 
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percent, and ninety-five percent of value) for a period of up to thirty-
five years.• Seventh, savings banks were also allowed to make mortgage 
loans of ninety percent of the value of the property for up to sixty 
thousand dollars.7 Finally, savings banks were authorized to make mort-
gage loans of up to seventy percent of the value of the real estate. These 
loans must be payable on demand or in not more than three years from 
the date of the note, and may not be in excess of one percent of the 
deposits of the savings bank corporation or fifty thousand dollars, 
whichever is greater. 8 
§13.9. Other Banking Statutes. The General Court also made 
some miscellaneous amendments to the banking laws. It allowed coop-
erative banks with assets of over five million dollars to make personal 
loans to a borrower in an amount up to nine thousand dollars if the 
amount of the loan over four thousand five hundred dollars is secured 
by a first lien on the borrower's property having a fair market value 
equal to the lien.• It also allowed them to invest in participation loans 
on real estate within their lending areas in an amount up to one and one-
quarter percent of their deposits, or seventy-five thousand dollars, 
whichever is greater.2 Finally, banking associations or corporations 
which exercise trust powers while acting as a fiduciary were authorized 
to establish a collective investment fund for the purpose of providing for 
temporary investment of cash held in a fiduciary capacity.3 The collec" 
tive investment fund must be administered in accordance with a decla-
ration of trust, with the fund bearing the expenses of administration. 
The banking corporation or association however must pay the cost of 
establishing the fund. • 
1 Acta of 1977, c. 364, amending G.L. c. 168, § 35(4), (6A), (6B). 
7 Acta of 1976, c. 62, amending G.L. c. 168, § 35(6A). 
1 Acta of 1977, c. 63, amending G.L. c. 168, § 35(2). 
§13.9. 1 Acta of 1977, c. 34, amending G.L. c. 170, § 26(8). 
1 Acta of 1977, c. 46, amending G.L. c. 170, § 23(4). 
1 Acta of 1977, c. 92, adding G.L. c. 167, § 54E. 
• Id. 
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